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Transfer of Property By,,a Pledgee
In certain communities, personal property of one kind or
another is frequently deposited by way of pledge or pawn to
secure performance of an obligation. The question as to the
rights of the pledged in the property, both before and after the
maturity of the debt, is of importance and the results flowing
from an improper and illegal transfer of the property by the
pledgee are often complicated. It is accordingly proposed, in the
following pages, to consider transactions involving transfers of
the property 'by the pledgee and to endeavor to formulate the
rules, -which regulate his rights and obligations in this respect.
According to Story's definition, which has been universally
accepted, a pledge or pawn is "4 bailment of 'personal property
as security for some debt or engagement." 1 The pledgee therefore has no title to the property deposited but merely the possession thereof, the general title remaining in the pledgor; but the
pledgee has a possessory interest in the chattel to the extent of
his debt, which amounts to a lien,.' In the case of the ordinary
bailment, the bailee's lien, according to the old common law, was
only a personal right and if he transferred the possession of the
chattel, except to a third party to be held in turn for him in bail,
he lost his lien. This was so even though the transfer did not
involve any element of conversion but was intended to operate
only as an assignment of the debt and lien.3 The surrender of
1. Story, Bailments, 9th Ed. sec. 286. See also Tennent v. Ins. Co.
(1908) 112 S. W. 754.
2. Williams v. Rorer (1842) 7 Mo. 556; Donald v. Suckling (1866)
L. R.-1 Q. B. 585; Halliday v. Holgate (1868) L. R.-3 Ex. 299. See
also Milliken-Helm Co. v. Albers (1912) 244 Mo. 38, 147 S. W. 1065;
Bank v. Totten (1905) 114 Mo. App. 97, 89 S. W. 65.
3. Ruggles v. Walker (1861) 34 Vt. 468. Contra, Goyena v. Berdoulay
(1915) 154 N. Y. S. 103. It is believed that the orthodox rule is unduly stringent and serves no reasonable purpose. As the debt today is
concededly assignable everywhere, the security, incidental to the debt,
and a part thereof might well also be held to pass with the debt, where
an intention so to pass it on is found.
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the possession of the chattel destroyed the lien. This, however,
is not always thf case with the pledgee for he is permitted to
assign the debt and security. 4 So too the pledgee can repledge
the chattel but for no longer time or greater amount than it was
pledged to him for.' Apparently then in the matter of disposing of his interest to a third party, the pledgee can freely do
so, so long as the act of transfer does not involve on his part an
assertion of a right in the chattel greater than he was given
by the contract of pledge. To this extent at least, the right of
the pledgee is not only a personal right, but is in result assimilated to a property interest in the goods. This should be the
case, for, if the debt is assignable, then the security, which is intended to be incidental to the debt, ought also to be assignable,
and if the pledgee has a possessory right, he ought to be able to
transfer the same to any one that he may please if only the disposition does not involve a denial of the pledgor's general property right: and does not interfere with the latter's right of redemption.6
It has been held ,that a pledgee may also deliver the possession of the goods to the pledgor without losing his lien if
4. Belden v. Perkins (1875) 78 Ill. 449; Drake v. Cloonan (1894) 99
Mich. 121, 57 N. W. 1098; Waddle v. Owen (1895) 43 Neb. 489, 61 N. W.
731; Chapman v. Brooks (1865) 31 N. Y. 75.
5. Donald v. Suckling, supra, note 2 (dictum) ; Meyer v. Moss (1902)
110 La. 132; 34 So. 332; Coleman v. Anderson (1904) 82 S. W. (Tex.)
1057 (dictum) ; Drake v. Cloonan, supra, note 4 (dictum). Of course,
the pledgee of the pledgee would acquire as security only the rights in
the property that the original pledgee had.
6. "**It appears that the pawnee may deliver the goods to a stranger
without consideration, or he may sell and assign his interest absolutely,
or he may assign it conditionally by way of pawn without, in either case,
destroying the original lien, or giving to the owner a right to reclaim
them on any other or better terms than he could have done before such
delivery or assignment." Jarvis v. Rogers (1819) 15 Mass. 1. c. 408. If
the right were merely personal, none of the above mentioned things could
have been done. If, however, the decisions had held the other way
they would not have been beyond reason. In Donald v. Suckling (1866)
L. R. 1 Q. B. 1. c. 618, Cockburn, C. J., said: "I think it unnecessary to
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they are delivered in bailment for a special purpose. This has
been done and the lien sustained.7 Under these conditions, it
is said that "the possession (of the pledgor) is perfectly consisthe decision in the present case to determine whether a party, with whom
an article has been pledged**** has a right to transfer his interest******.
I should certainly hesitate to lay down the affirmative of that proposition. Such a right in the pawnee seems quite inconsistent with the undoubted right of the pledgor to have the thing pledged returned to him
immediately on the tender of the amount for which the pledge was given. In some instances it may well be inferred from the nature of the
thing pledged *** that the pawnor, though perfectly willing that the
article should be entrusted to the custody of the pawnee, would not have
parted with it on the terms that it should be passed on to others and
committed to the custody of strangers." The notion of the Chief Justice, however, has not prevailed. But the dictum raises two important
questions (to be dealt with infra), a transfer of the pledge being permissible: (1) to whom must the pledgor make tender at the maturity
of the debt, and (2) if the pledged property be injured, or converted by
the transferee against whom may the pledgor proceed?
7. Wilkinson v Misner (1911) 158 Mo. App. 551, 138 S. W. 931. In
this case the pledgee returned the pledged property to the pledgor for
the purpose of realizing a portion of the debt secured through a sale if
it could be arranged. It was held that the lien was not destroyed by
such a surrender of the property to the pledgor, but the question arose
between the parties. Bank v. Trust Co. (1909) 135 Mo. App. 366, 115 S.
W. 1071 holds the pledgee's lien good as against creditors of the pledgor
where the property was left by the pledgee in the hands of an agent of
the pledgor, who agreed to keep the property for the pledgee. The case
is of course distinguishable from those under discussion because-it can
be said that the possession of the agent is not the possession of the pledgor, the former as to this particular transaction not acting as the agent of
the latter. Leahy v. Simpson (1894) 60 Mo. App. 83 (dispute between
parties). See also Bank v. Pierce (1919) 280 Mo. 614, 219 S. W. 578;
Palmtag v. Doutrick (1881) 59 Cal. 154; Thayer v. Dwight (1870) 104
Mass. 254; Macauley v. Macauley (1885) 35 Hun. (N. Y.) 556. Contra,
Bodenhammer v. Newsom (1857) 5 Jones (N. C.) 107, holding that the
lien would not be sustained as against an innocent person dealing with
the pledgor believing, because of the pledgor's possession, that the latter
was the owner of the property. The court in this case holds the pledgee
estopped to assert his lien. Obviously if the pledgee delivers back possession of the pledge to the pledgor without any agreement with respect
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tent with the original right of the pledgee." 8 The pledgor is here
holding the goods not in his own right but in subservience to
the pledgee's special possessory interest. On the other hand, if
the chattels are given to the pledgor in bailment for general use,
the courts will not sustain the pledgee's lien as against innocent
purchasers from and creditors of the pledgor, even though there
has been a special agreement between the parties for the preservation of the lien.9 Probably, too, the lien would not be sustained even as against the pledgor under these conditions."0 It
is usually said that the reason for holding the lien invalid
under these facts is. because the essence of the lien is the retention of the property over which it exists. If, therefore, the
to the lien, it is gone. The pledgee's conduct under such conditions is a
waiver of the lien. Bank v. Bradshaw (1912) 91 Neb. 210, 135 N. W. 830.
In the case of an ordinary bailment, the rule at the common law was
that if the bailee parted with possession of the property to the bailor, his
lien was lost under all conditions. "The very definition of the word lien
as 'the right to retain' indicates that it must cease when possession is relinquished." McFttrland v. Wheeler (1841) 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 467, p. 473.
Occasionally the pledgee has given the custody of the property to
the pledgor. The property has not bean bailed with the pledgor, but has
been loaned or entrusted to the pledgor as the borrower or the servant
of the pledgee. In such cases it is clear that the lien should not be lost
and the authority is in accord. The possession of the borrower or servant is that of the lender or master. Reeves v. Capper (1838) 5 Bing. New
Cas. 136; Clare v. Agerter (1892) 47 Kan. 604, 28 Pac. 694. See generally
as to the distinction between custody and possession, Pollock and Wright,
Possession in the Common Law, p. 138 et seq.
8. Palmtag v. Doutrick, supra, note 7, 59 Cal. 1. c. 159.
9. Colby v. Cressy (1830) 5 N. H. 237; Walker v. Staples (1862) 87
Mass. 34; Gamson v. Pritchard (1911) 210 Mass. 296, 96 N. E. 715 (dictuln) ; Jackson v. Kincaid (1896) 4 Okla. 554, 46 Pac. 587; (statute)
Fletcher v. Howard (1826) 2 Aikens (Vt.) 115, 16 Am. Dec. 686.
10. The cases often suggest that the lien would not be sustained under
these conditions, probably because of the notion which the courts have
and repeatedly state although usually obiter, that a pledgee's lien is only
a personal right to retain possession. This was undoubtedly the conception
which the courts had as to the lien of the ordinary bailee (see supra note
7) and it was natural and easy to carry over this idea when it came to
dealing with the lien of a pledgee. It is believed that this conception is
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property is not retained, the lien must be gone.1' If this is the
real reason for the rule, it is difficult to understand how the
lien in cases of special limited bailments with the pledgor can
be sustained, because in that case the pledgee does not keep the
possession of the chattels. But perhaps cases of so called special
bailments may be considered as cases of custody, and so reconciled with and distinguished from those now under consideration.lla Unless, however, such a distinction can be made it is
unfortunate and that the actual decisions do not of necessity support the
proposition. See infra note 11, and text in connection therewith. But
see dictum in McFarlandv. Wheeler, 26 Wendell 1. c. 481. "Such ** lien
may be continued ** so far as the parties are concerned even after the
actual possession has been parted with; but not to the prejudice of general creditors **." The dictum is the obiter opinion of Chancellor Walworth. See also Staples v. Simpson (1894) 60 Mo. App. 73.
11. In Chitwood v. Zinc Co. (1902) 93 Mo. App. 225. C was indebted
to plaintiff. C had a mining lease and some ore on the premises. C
verbally authorized plaintiff to look to the ore for the satisfaction of his
debt, to which plaintiff assented. C thereafter and before plaintiff took
possession of the ore, sold and assigned his lease to defendant, who
bought with knowledge of the plaintiff's agreement with respect to the
ore. Defendant then sold the ore, and plaintiff sued in trover. It was
held that the action would not lie, as plaintiff was not a pledgee, never

having had possession of the ore. Probably there never had been a delivery of the ore to the plaintiff, either actual or constructive, and for

this reason the relation of pledgor and pledgee never existed.

But if

there had been a delivery of the ore, then the case might have held that

the pledgee had lost his lien because of C's possession of the ore.
McFarlandv. Wheeler, supra, note 7, 26 Wendell 467 (dictum). "Continuance in possession is indispensible to the right of a lien; an abandonment of the custody *** frustrates any power to retain (i. e. the chattels)
and operates as an absolute waiver of the lien." Walker v. Staples (1862)
87 Mass. 34, p. 35. "Indeed possession may be considered as the very essence of a pledge *** and if possession be once given up, the pledge as

such is extinguished." Casey v. Cavaroc (1877) 96 U. S. 1. c. 477. In
the last two cited cases, the question as to the validity of the lien was
between the pledgee and an innocent person claiming under the pledgor,
and the pledgor had been placed in possession of the" goods by the pledgee
not for special purposes.
Ila. See supra note 7.

LAW SERIES

23,

MISSOURI BULLETIN

not perceived how the cases can be reconciled. In fact if the
pledgee's right is merely a right to retain, all cases where he
parts with the possession of the goods, except for purposes of
enforcing his lien, ought to result in the loss of the lien. However, as has been shown, this is not the result, and so it cannot
be said that the lien is a right solely to retain, dependent for its
existence on actual and continued possession of the goods. There
are too many cases holding the lien valid where there is no pos.
session in the pledgee. The proper basis for the decision to the
effect that the lien is gone if the property is returned to the
pledgor for general use, is that the pledgor's possession clothes
him with apparent ownership of the goods, and because of this
fact makes fraud on creditors of and innocent purchasers from
the pledgor too easy. The law has never favored secret liens. 12
If the lien is declared invalid on this ground, all of the cases are
easily reconciled, and we are not forced to say what is not so,
namely, that the pledgee's right is merely one to retain possession
of the pledged property. Furthermore, if this is the reason for
refusing to sanction the lien, it could be said with perfect propriety and consistency that the lien would be good in favor of
the pledgee as against the pledgor. and until rights of a bona fide
purchaser or creditor have intervened. In other words, if the
pledgee is not estopped to assert the lien he can do so, and he will
not be estopped until some one has taken the goods from the
12. In Valley Bank v. Frank (1882) 12 Mo. App. 460 it was held that
an innocent purchaser has a better equity than he who having advanced
money on part of a stock in trade, leaves it in the possession of the original owner. But th(.re was no pledge in the case as there had never been
any delivery of the property to the intended pledgee, whatsoever. See
also Roeder Bros. v. Brewery Co. (1888) 33 Mo. App. 69. Both of the
last cited cases deal with the general problem under discussion.
"The requirement of possession is an inexorable rule of law, adopted
to prevent fraud and deception, for if the debtor remains in possession
the law presumes that those who deal with him do so on the faith of his
being the unqualified owner of the goods." Casey v. Cavaroc, supra, note
11, 96 U. S. 1. c. 490. See also Moors v. Reading (1897) 167 Mass. 322,
45 N. E. 760, and Glenn, Creditor's Rights, chap. XI.
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pledgor, reasonably assuming that the latter's possession signified
ownership. The grounds for such a decision would not be that
the pledgee has no possessory right, but that it would not be just
to assert his right to security against an innocent buyer from
the pledgor or the latter's creditor. Even though the law mignt
not be willing to give the pledgee a lien against the pledgor, when
possession of the goods has been given to the latter, it could still
so refuse to do without holding that the pledgee's right is gone
because the right depends on continued possession. It could be
held as a matter of policy that no right ought to remain in the
pledgee unter these conditions because of the ever present danger
of fraud to third parties. Such a holding would reach a result
possibly to be desired, and at the same time would obviate the
confusion that is bound to arise in other cases, if it is stated that
the pledgee's interest is a purely personal one.
Wherever the transfer of the pledged property by the pledgee
to a third party is actually and expressly made and is legal, there
is no difficulty in determining the rights resulting; but occasionally the pledgee does not transfer the property but merely the
debt, and the question then is whether the assignment of the
debt operates to carry with it to the assignee the security as
well. It is not possible to hold that the assignment gives a legal
title to the pledge to the assignee, for there has been no delivery
of the chattel, actual or symbolical, and that is always essential
if a possessory interest is being transferred. Still, it might
be held that the assignee in equity ought to have a right to use
the chattel, if he desires to avail himself of such security. The
assignor could be said to be the trustee with respect to the security for the assignee and there is authority for such a rule.13
It has, however, been held contra to this, it being said that in
13. Holland etc. Co. v. See (1910) 146 Mo. App. 269, 130 S. W. 354;
(pledgee of a secured obligation held entitled to security, which secured
his pledge; the security was a deed of trust.) Hawkins v. Bank (1897)

150 Ind. 117, 49 N. E. 957. Ramboz v. Stansbury (1910) 110 Pac. 472,
13 Cal. A. 649; Perry v. Parrott (1901) 67 Pac. (Cal.) 144. See also Ware
Murphy and Co. v. Russell (1876) 57 Ala. 43. In the case last cited the
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the absence of an express agreement giving the assignee the benefit of the pledge, these equitable rights ought not to pass.'
It
is a question of whether or not a court is inclined to the belief
that the assignor intended to give the assignee, as a result of the
transfer of the debt, all rights with respect to its collection that
he had. An affirmative answer to this question would not seem
to be stretching one's imagination and accordingly it is urged that
a decision which, by implication, gives the assignee of the debt
the right to the security as well is sound and just.
Whenever the pledgee transfers his rights in the debt and
the security to a third party it becomes necessary to determine
the rights and obligations of the pledgor on the maturity of the
debt and how he will entitle himself to regain possession of the
pledged chattel. At an early date it was suggested that the pledgor could not be required to pay the debt to a person other than
the original pledgor because he had never agreed to do so 5 but
this dictum has not been followed; and the cases hold that in
the event of the transfer of the debt and the security and notice
being given to the pledgor of this fact, he must pay the assignee
and cannot claim the property free from the lien unless he makes
due tender to the latter. 16 Such a rule only carries out the ordinary rule in the matter of assignments. The debtor must always,
on notice being given to him of the assignment, respect the
rights of the assignee. Of course, if the debtor should happen
to pay the debt in good faith to the pledgee, not knowing of the
assignment, then he ought to be able to claim and regain the pledged property from the assignee without offering to pay the debt,
for the burden is on the assignee to bring home notice to the
court held that the security would follow the debt but did not go into
the question of whether the assignment would be an equitable one or
would amount to a legal assignment of title.
14. Johnson v. Smith (1850) 11 Hump. (Tenn.) 396.
15. Donald v. Suckling, supra, note 6.
16. Talty v. Freedman's etc. Trust Co. (1876) 93 U. S. 321, 23 L. Ed.
886; Bradley v. Parks (1876) 83 Ill. 169; Goss v. Emerson (1851) 23 N.
H. 38, holds that the pledgee's interest is assignable, not dealing, however,
with the matter of tender.
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pledgor of the assignment."
It is difficult, however, to conceive of the last suggested case ever actually arising because, as
a rule, the pledgor when he makes tender will demand a return
of the pledge, and if it is not returned to him, he will usually
receive sufficient information from the pledgee as to its whereabouts to put him on inquiry as to whether or not there has not
been an assignment of the debt. If the pledgor were thus on inquiry, he ought to be held to pay the pledgee at his peril.'
It will sometimes happen that the pledgee will transfer his
interest in the debt and the pledge to a third party legally and
an injury to, or a conversion of, the property will occur after the
transfer. There is no question but that the pledgor could, if he
so desired, sue the assignee and recover.1sa The assignee should
take the property subject to the burdens and the pledgor's general property right therein. The assignee would be equally obligated with respect to the safekeeping and the return of the property. Perhaps, however, the pledgor would prefer to sue the
pledgee; perhaps an action against the latter would be more
profitable and worth while. What little authority there is dealing with this problem holds that the pledgor, after the pledgee has
legally passed the pledge on to another, cannot hold the pledgee
to any of his original obligations as to the property. It is said
that the pledgee may legally part with the debt and with his pos17. Williston on Contracts, sec. 413 and 433.
18. It might well be said that the debtor would be on inquiry and so
have notice from the very fact that the pledgee did not offer to return
the pledged property on the tender of the debt. This fact should indicate
to the pledgor that the property might possibly be in the hands of some
person other than the pledgee, claiming a right under the latter.
18a. The cases rather assume this proposition than decide it. But see
Dibert v. D'Arcy (1912) 248 Mo. 1. c. 651, 154 S. W. 1116, where the
court said: "The assignment of the notes and bonds to the syndicate
placed it squarely in the shoes of the bank (the pledgee) with respect to
the entire transaction. It not only became the owner of the debt, but the
trustee and agent of the pledgor with respect to the collaterals (the bonds
assigned)." See also Chouteau v. Allen (1879) 70 Mo. 290; Bank v.
Davis (1901) 113 Ga. 341, 38 S. E. 836; Taggart v. Packard (1867) 39

Vt. 628.
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session of the property and interest therein and when he does,
his transferee is substituted in his place. A pledgee "cannot be
charged with the wrongful act of another over which he had no

control. A mortagee might as well be held liable for the destruction of the mortgaged property after he had parted with all
his interest by a valid assignment." lsb It would seem that the
logical and proper result is reached in this case. After all the
pledgor must be taken as knowing that the debt is assignable;
that with it may go the pledged property, and that as a result of
an assignment the pledgee will step out of the transaction altogether.
A pledgee has occasionally attempted to pass the pledged
property without the debt, retaining the right to collect the latter
himself. It has been held, under these conditions, that the transferee of the property gets nothing and that the lien cannot in
this way be severed from the debt. The only justification for the
existence of the lien is the fact that it is security for the debt,
which is the principal thing. Accordingly it is entirely right to
hold that an attempted assignment of the lien without the debt is
a nullity, serving to vest no rights in the transferee whatsoever. 18c
It would seem to follow too that, even though the pledgee has
18b. Goss v. Emerson (1851) 23 N. H. 1. c. 43. In the last case cited
the debt secured was negotiable. In Bank v. Davis, supra, note 18a, it was
held accord, but the court suggested that if the debt was not negotiable
and the pledgee's successor had converted the property that the pledgee
would also be liable for this act. The court seemed to incline to the opinion that the pledgee whose debt is negotiable is licensed to freely pass
the pledge to another, and escape his liabilities, whereas the pledgee of
a non-negotiable debt would not be free to do so. It is to be noted,
however, that this is not the underlying theory of Goss v. Emerson, supra. The court, in that case, based its decision on the fact that the pledgee has an alienable interest in the property, which he could pass on and
"wash his hands of," and likens his position to that of the mortgagee
who parts with his interest in the, mortgaged goods. In any event the
distinction would not seem to be well taken, for non-negotiable choses
must be regarded today as being freely assignable if not freely "alienable." But see Cockburn, C. J., in Donald v. Suckling, supra, note 6.
18c. Easton v. Hodges (1883) 18 Fed. 677 (dictum); Van Eman v.
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not passed the lien to his transferee, his attempted transfer
ought to destroy his own right to the security. While it is
true that the assignment or grant was not effective in the
way desired, still at least it did show that the lien was not desired
by the pledgee any longer as security, and this fact, coupled with
the actual giving up of the possession of the property, ought to
end the lien altogether. After the pledgee has abandoned his
right, he ought not to be heard to say that this right is revived
in his favor just because he was unable to carry out his original
intent with respect to the transfer.
If the pledgee passes the property to another, and the transaction involves the assertion of a greater right in the property
on his part than he legally has, the transfer and disposition is illegal. This is the result if the pledgee disposes of the property
as his own ;19or if he pledges the property to secure a debt greater in amount than that secured to him ;20 or, it would seem, if
he pledges the property for no greater amount, but for a longer
period of time than it was pledged to him; or if he improperly exercises his power of sale to satisfy the debt. 1 In all of these
Stanchfield (1867)

13 Minn. 1.c. 75. See also Dexter v. McClellan (1897)

22 So. (Ala.) 461.
19. Schaaf v. Fries (1901) 90 Mo. App. 111 (dictum) ; Wood v. Matthews (1881) 73 Mo. 477; Gay v. Moss (1867) 34 Cal. 125; Wilson v.
Little (1849) 2 N. Y. 443; Lamb v. O'Reilly (1895) 34 N. Y. Supp. 235;
Upham v. Barbour (1896) 65 Minn. 364, 68 N. W. 42. In a case where
the pledge is of shares of stock, the pledgee is not usually obligated to
keep the specific shares, and there is no conversion if at all times the
pledgee keeps in hand the same number of the same kind of shares as
were pledged. Berlin v. Eddy (1863) 33 Mo. 426. But see contra, Allen
v. DuboLs (1898) 75 N. W. 443, 117 Mich. 115. (Identical shares must
be returned.)
20. Richardson v. Ashby (1895) 132 Mo. 238, 33 S.W. 806; Smith v.
Savin (1894) 141 N. Y. 315, 36 N. E. 338; Work v. Bennett (1872) 70,
Pa. St. 484.
21. Richardson v. Ashby (1895) 132 Mo. 238, 33 S.W. 806; (dictum)
Greer v. Bank (1895) 128 Mo. 559, 30 S.W. 319; Dibert v. D'Arcy (1912)
248 Mo. 617, 154 S. W. 1116; Feige v. Burt (1898) 118 Mich. 243, 77
N. W. 928; Ainsworth v. Bowen (1859) 9 Wisc. 348.
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cases the question arises as to the rights of the pledgor both as
against the pledgee and the latter's transferee.
If at the time of the transfer, the debt had been paid, the
pledgor could recover of the pledgee the full value of the property,22 and this should be recoverable in an action sounding in
conversion,22 or the pledgor should be permitted to waive the
tort and sue in assumpsit 24 for goods sold and delivered.

A

pledgor ought also to be able to sue in either one of these forms
of action, if, at the time of the transfer, the debt had matured
and he had duly tendered the amount thereof to the pledgee; but
22. Hilgert v. Levin (1897) 72 Mo. App. 48; (illegal debt secured)
Hyre v. Bank (1892) 48 Mo. App. 434; Smith v. Becker (1916) 192 Mo.
App. 597, 184 S. W. 943; Southworth Co. v. Lamb (1884) 82 Mo. 242;
August v. O'Brien (1900) 63 N. Y. Supp. 989.
23. Southworth Co. v. Lamb (1884) 82 Mo. 242; Jackson v. Shawl
(1865) 29 Cal. 267; Hazard v. Loring (1852) 10 Cush. (Mass.) 266; Bryson v. Raynor (1866) 25 Md. 424; (dictum) Cass v. Higenbotam (1885)
100 N. Y. 248, 3 N. E. 189.
24. Whiting v. McDonald (1790) 1 Root (Conn.) 444; Bryson v. Raynor, supra, note 23 (dictum). See also Woodward, Law of Quasi Contract, sec. 277. In Sandeen v. Railroad Co. (1883) 79 Mo. 278 it was held
that a plaintiff could not confer jurisdiction on a justice court by waiving
the tort for a conversion of property and suing for goods sold and delivered. There is, however, dictum in that case to the effect that assumpsit ought not to lie in a case of conversion. Said the court: "It
is the extreme of fiction to impose the deliberation, solemnity, and obligation of a sale upon the actual facts of a highway robbery. And
while there should be a redress for every wrong, the experience of the
past has shown that this object will be most universally achieved by employing such forms of redress as the actual facts constituting the wrong
in every case may suggest and call for. This doctrine of fiction is not
in accord with the spirit and logic of our practice act, which require the
pleader to set out the actual facts constituting his cause of action or
defense." But see Finlay v. Bryson (1884) 84 Mo. 664 explaining the
Sandeen case, supra, and limiting the decision to a holding that "the
plaintiff will rot be indulged in the fiction, if the effect of it is to give
jurisdiction ** to a court, which otherwise would not possess it." Probably a plaintiff would be allowed to waive the tort and sue for goods
sold and delivered in Missouri. See Duncan v. Smith (1920) 226 S. W.
621. And see accord with the general rule that the action will lie, Redel
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in this case the amount of his recovery should be reduced by the
amount of the debt with the interest thereon. The debt is held
24
to be proper matter for recoupment. a
A pledgee may illegally transfer the property before the
maturity of the debt, or, if it has matured, before a tender has
been made or the debt paid. Under these states of facts the
pledgor ought to be able to sue in case for the destruction of his
general property right, and should recover the difference between
the value of the property at the time of its appropriation and
the amount of the debt, plus the interest allowable on the same.
Such an amount would represent the value of his interest.24b
There would also appear to be no objection, under the assumed
facts, if the pledgee's act of transfer was a sale to permit the
pledgor to sue in assumpsit for money had and received, and
to recover in such an action the difference between the amount
that the pledgee had received on the sale of the pledge and the
amount of the debt, with interest to the date of the sale. Everything in the way of value in the property in excess of the amount
of the debt belongs to the pledgor. The law has been jealous
of the pledgor's "equity" and zealous to safeguard and preserve
it for him whenever possible. While the pledgee is permitted
to hold the pledged property so long as the debt remains unpaid,
and fhe pledgor usually ought not to be able to compel the formv. Stone Co. (1907) 126 Mo. App. 163, 103 S. W. 568; Crane v. Murray
(1904) 106 Mo. App. 697, 80 S. W. 280; Gordon v. Brunner (1872) 49
Mo. 570.
24a. Belden v. Perkins (1875) 78 Ill. 449; Baltimore etc. Co. v. Dalrymple (1866) 25 Md. 269; Farrar v. Paine (1899) 173 Mass. 58, 53 N.
E. 146; Feige v. Burt (1898) 118 Mich. 243, 77 N. W. 928; Cropsey v.
Averill (1879) 8 Neb. 151. But see contra, Ball v. Stanley (1833) 5
Yerger (Tenn.) 199, 26 Am. Dec. 263, holding that the pledgee may not
recoup the amount of his debt, but will have to bring another action to
recover the same.
24b. Nabring v. Bank (1877) 58 Ala. 204. In this case the plaintiff had
pledged shares in a corporation to the defendant, who had appropriated
the same and sold them. -It was held that if the defendant had transferred the shares to his own name perhaps trover would not lie but that
case would for the destruction of the plaintiff's general property interest.
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er to sell the pledge, and by so doing to realize for him the excess value of the property over and above the amount of the
debt, 24 c still if the pledgee does sell, it ought to be for the pledgor's account and anything in excess of the debt derived from the
sale ought to be given to the pledgor. This being the duty of
the pledgee, it might very well be said that the pledgor should be
in a position, if the pledgee has tortiously sold the goods, to say
that any money realized from the sale in excess of the debt was
his and was received to his use. The only obstacle to such a contention by the pledgor would be the fact that the pledgee, when
he sold the goods, did not intend to satisfy the debt; but the latter ought not to be allowed to make such a contention, because in
order so to do he will have to explain that his sale was illegal and
tortious. Of course, it might also be said, in a case where the sale
happened before the maturity of the debt, that from the very
nature of things it would be impossible to satisfy a debt not as
yet due; but the only objection to accelerating the maturity of any
obligation is that so aoing may injure one of the parties by varying the terms of the bargain. The pledgee, however, is in no
position to make an objection of this kind, as he has already appropriated the debtor's money. He should not be heard to say
that he did this for any purpose other than the satisfaction of the
debt. So far as the pledgor is concerned, he ought to have a
choice either to say that there has or has not been satisfaction of
the debt. No authority which permits the pledgor to sue under
the assumed facts in assumpsit for money had and received has
been found; but upon general principles, because of the fact that
the pledgee has been unjustly enriched to this extent, the action
should lie.2 5 It seems needless to say, however, that if the pledg24c. But see Bank v. Kilpatric (1907) 204 Mo. 119, 102 S. W. 499; Cold
Storage Co. v. Pitts (1913) 176 Mo. App. 134. 167 S. W. 1182.
25. See Woodward, Law of Quasi Contract, sec. 273. See Miles v.
Walther (1876) 3 Mo. App. 96, a case not in point but containing valuable
discussion of the principle under consideration. See also same case in
5 Mo. App. 594 (memo.).
It has also been held that a pledgor may sue the pledgee for breach
of the contract to safely keep and restore the pledged property. Brown,
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ce's act of transfer was not a sale the action for money had and
received would not lie, for without a sale there has been no receipt of money by the pledgee at all. 6 If there were no sale,
the pledgor's remedy would be in case, as above stated.
The question remains whether a pledgor may sue the pledgee in conversion if the pledgee has illegally transferred the property and the pledgor has neither paid nor tendered the amount of
the debt? This question might be presented in a case where the
pledgee made the transfer before the maturity of the obligation
secured and the pledgor attempted to sue before that time, or
in a case where the pledgee transferred the property, either before, or after, the maturity of the debt, but the pledgor was
suing after such time. An easy way of disposing of the whole
question and a way adopted by many cases is to say that when
the pledgee wrongfully disposes of the property, that this act
ends the bailment, destroys the lien, and entitles the pledgor to
the immediate possession of the.goods.2 7 Under such a line of
decisions all that a pledgor need show is the pledgee's act of
transfer and the court will entertain the action, usually assessing
the damages at the value of the goods at the time of the pledgee's
wrongful act, 28 less the amount of the debt with interest thereon

to the date of the judgment.

Of course, the reasoning adopted

v. Bank (1904) 66 C. C. A. 293, 132 Fed. 450. The measure of damages
in such an action would be the same as in case, or in assumpsit for money
had and received.
26. Woodward, Law of Quasi Contract, sec. 273.
27. Depuy v. Clark (1859) 12 Ind. 427; Baltimore etc. Co. v. Dalrymple
(1866) 25 Md. 269; Cortelyou v. Lansing (1805) 2 Cai. Cas. (N. Y.) 200;
Glidden v. Bank (1895) 53 Ohio St. 588, 42 N. E. 995; (dictum) Austin
v. Vanderbilt (1906) 48 Ore. 206, 85 Pac. 519; Work v. Bennett (1872)
70 Pa. S. 484. Would such an action lie before the maturity of the debt
secured? Accordiog to the theory of the cases it wotildV seem that it
should.
28. Occasionally the courts have adopted as the proper measure of
damages the highest intermediate value of the converted property between
the time of its conversion and the date of the trial of the action. This
rule for assessing damages, however, has usually been confined to cases
where the property converted consisted of stocks or bonds, or some
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in these cases dispenses with the necessity of tender, and, because
the bailment is at an end would permit the pledgor to sue for
the conversion of the goods even before the maturity of the
debt.29 It is to be noted that the damages recoverable in such
an action are substantially the same as are recoverable in an action on the case, or, in the case of a sale by the pledgee, in an
action in assumpsit for money had and received. Accordingly, it
can be said that the result of such a holding is not improper. It
is believed, however, that there is no proper theoretical basis for
holding that the pledgor's right to sue in conversion is as of the
date of the pledgee's transfer of the pledge regardless of the
question of whether the debt has matured at that time and
whether the pledgor has tendered the same to the pledgee. It
is urged (unless the pledgor has rescinded the agreement),;
that without the maturity of the debt and a tender of the same,
the pledgor has no right to sue in conversion but that his remedy
should be as above explained, namely, case or possibly assumpsit
for money had and received, if the act of transfer by the pledgee
was a sale of the pledge. It is also submitted that if a pledgee
may rescind he cannot claim possession of the goods without first
making a tender of the debt.
An action for conversion is predicated on the fact that a
plaintiff is entitled to the immediate possession of the chattel and
has been deprived thereof. If the theory of the action is trover,
the plaintiff recovers money but the money is allowed in lieu of
the chattel, and the plaintiff has a right to the money, only, because he had a still more fundamental right to the chattel. In
other words, money is substituted for the specific chattel and its
recovery is not allowed unless the plaintiff has a right to the
possession of the chattel at the time he brings his action. 30 In
article of fluctuating value. See infra note 32 and text in connection there-

with.
29. No case has been found where the action has been entertained before the maturity of the debt although as indicated such an action, under
the theory adopted, would be properly brought.
30. Gordon v. Harper (1796) 7 Term. Rep. 9; Union etc. Co. v. Mal-
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every pledge transaction the agreement between the parties is
that the property is not to be returned to the pledgor until the
debt has been paid, and so by the very terms of the agreement
the pledgor is precluded from asserting a right to the possession
of the goods until the debt secured has been satisfied, or at least
until he has offered to pay the same and his tender has been rejected.oa It is because of this contractual obligation, resting on
the pledgor that it is urged that theoretically the action of con;
version ought not to lie if only the pledgee has misappropriated
the goods. To make the pledgee's conduct objectionable in this
form of action, in addition to the illegal disposition of the goods by
the pledgee, the debt should have matured and the amount thereof either paid or tendered. The pledgee's wrong ought not to
make the pledgor's rights greater, nor put him in a better or different position with respect to the possession of the pledge than
if there had been no misappropriation by the pledgee. Accordingly the sounder cases are to the effect that the pledgor, if he
is affirming his rights as a pledgor, in spite of the illegal transfer
by the pledgee, cannot sue in conversion until he has tendered
the amount of the debt, which is not permissible until after the
maturity of the same.

31

It will be argued against the last suggestion that the
lory etc. Co. (1895) 157 Ill. 554, 41 N. E. 888; Stearns v. Vincent (1883)
50 Mich. 209, 15 N. W. 86; Brown v. Pratt (1855) 4 Wis. 513. See also
Sutherland Damages, 4th. ed. sec. 1108, "***to entitle the plaintiff to
recover two things are necessary: first, property in the plaintiff; and
secondly, a wrongful conversion by the defendant." See also Martin,
Civil Procedure, sec. 97.
30a. A tender of the debt when due ought to be the equivalent of performance so far as bringing the action of trover is concerned. Upon
tender the pledgor has put the pledgee in default. See Southworth Co. v.
Lamb (1884) 82 Mo. 242; Lawrence v. Maxwell (1873) 53 N. Y. 19. See
also Tennent v. Ins. Co. (1908) 133 Mo. App. 345, 112 S. W. 754; McCalla
v. Clark (1875) 55 Ga. 53.
31. "But it is a contradiction in fact, and would be to call a thing that
which it is not, to say that the pledgee consents by his act to revest in
the pledgor the immediate interest or right in the pledge which by the
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bailment is ended as soon as the pledgee converts the
pledge and that an immediate right of possession accrues in favor
of the pledgor.a1 a It is not believed, however, that the argument
is sound. There is more than a bailment involved; the pledgor
has agreed that the possession of the property shall be out of
him until the debt is paid and this contract is binding on him even
though the pledgee has breached his side of the same. Perhaps
the pledgee's violation of the agreement might warrant the pledgbargain is out of the pledgor and in the pledgee. Therefore for any such
wrong an action of trover or detinue, each of which assumes an immediate right of possession in the plaintiff, is not maintainable, for that
right is clearly not in the plaintiff." Halliday v. Holgate (1868) L. R.
3 Ex. 299, p. 302. See also accord Donald v. Suckling (1866) L. R. 1
Q. B. 585, which was followed in Halliday v. Holgate, supra.
In McClintock v. Bank (1893) 120 Mo. 127, 24 S. W. 1052 it was
held that a wrongful transfer of the pledge would not wipe out the debt
secured and "until that debt be in some way got but of the way, plaintiff
(who was the pledgor's assignee) has no legal right to the stock (the
pledge) or its proceeds." The action was for conversion. See accord
Schaaf v. Fries (1901) 90 Mo.App. 111; Hopper v. Smith (1882) 63 How.
Pr. (N. Y.) 34.
In Richardson v. Ashby (1895) 132 Mo. 238, 33 S.W. 806 the pledgee
sued the pledgor for the debt secured, having prior to his action converted the pledged property. The pledgor counterclaimed for the conversion, but had never made a tender of the debt. The court held that

the tender of the debt was not a condition precedent to the counterclaim.
This decision is not believed to be essentially inconsistent with those in
McClintock v. Bank and Schaaf v. Fries, supra. The cases can be distinguished. It is proper to hold a tender essential in a case where the
pledgor is suing the pledgee, but where the pledgee is himself the moving
party and is suing for the debt, the matter of a tender by the pledgor becomes unimportant.
In Hagan v. Bank (1904) 182 Mo. 319, 81 S.W. 171 plaintiff sued
for an accounting and for redemption, if possible. It was held that in
an action in equity the tender would not be required, especially where the
pledgee had admitted the conversion and the sale of the pledge. But
the rule in equity as to a tender may well be, and frequently is, different
from the rule at law. But see Bell v. Bank (1908) 143 Cal. 234, 94 Pac.
889. See as to what constitutes a tender Hurt v. Cook (1899) 151 Mo.
416, 52 S.W. 396.

31a. See supra note 27 and text in connection therewith.
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or's rescission of the contract 3 lb and give him a right after rescission, to claim a return of the property. In every case of rescission, however, there must be restitution, and restitution entails a return by the rescinding party of all benefit received under
the contract. If therefore the pledgor is claiming that he has
rescinded he will fail because he has not returned the money
which he had received from the pledgee. It seems certain that
the pledgor can only claim a right to the property pledged if he
is either affirming the contract or disaffirming it, and in each
case his right to the property can only be based on the fact that
he has offered the money to the pledgee.
It might be said that requiring a tender by the pledgor is
futile. Why compel a man to make a tender and demand the
return of the goods when his demand will only be refused, as
will of necessity be the case? It would seem that a sufficient answer to such a question would be that without the tender no right
exists. But in addition to this reason, it is believed that fixing
the date of tender as the time when the pledgor will have a right
to the possession of the goods will, in some cases, make the matter of assessing damages easier and more accurate. Suppose
that the appropriation of the property occurs before the maturity
of the debt, and at that time the same is worth $60, but at the
time of the maturity of the debt it is worth $100. If justice is to
be done to the pledgor he ought to be able to compel the pledgee
to account for the greater sum, and this will be easy if it is said
that the right of the pledgor arises when he makes a tender and
not before. Or again, suppose that the goods at the time of
the conversion were worth $100 but at the time of the maturity
of the debt were worth $60. In trover it would be proper, to
allow to the pledgor the value of the goods at the time that he,
by his agreement, would have been entitled to them, and no more,
yet if it is held that the pledgor's right is as of the date the pledgee
appropriated the property,the pledgor will receive $40 more than
he would have gotten had there been no breach of the agreement
31b. See infra note 32a and text in connection therewith.
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at all. The fact is that if we hold that the pledgor's right to
the possession of the goods and to sue in trover arises at the
very moment of the pledgee's transfer of the pledge, we are not
dealing with the situation as it is. We are not treating the matter
accurately and with precision and, in the matter of measuring
damages, the rule will not afford at all times a proper amount of
compensation. Sometimes the pledgor will not receive enough
and sometimes he will receive too much. On the other hand, if
we treat the rights of the parties as they actually are under the
agreement, and hold that the pledgor's right to possession (and
hence his right to sue in conversion) does not arise until he has
made a tender we shall be able to give him in the way of damages exactly the sum of money that he expected to get out of
the contract, and that it was agreed he should get.
The amount of money which a pledgor will recover, if he
sues in case, and that which he will recover if he sues in conversion, upon the theory that his right arises as of the date of
the pledgee's transfer of the property, will be the same. In a
loose sense, therefore, it cannot be said that this latter group of
decisions goes very far wrong; but the fact is that a pledgor
ought to have an election between case on the one hand and trover
on the other. The pledgor ought to be able to claim the value
of his general property interest either at the time of the illegal
disposition of the property by the pledgee, or at the time of the
maturity of the same and tender, less, of course, the amount of
the debt. It is the function of case to enable the pledgor to recover the first mentioned sum, and should be the function of
trover to enable him to recover the last mentioned. But trover
can only (1o this if it is held that the right to the possession of
the pledge is as of the date of tender. If it is held that the right
to the possession of the goods is as of the date of the transfer
of the pledge, the result of the action is to allow the pledgor as
damages only the value of his general property interest at the
time of its destruction. There can be no objection to this so
long as the value of the pledge does not change. If however the
property rises in value the pledgor will lose the amount of the
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increase unless indeed some unusual measure of damages is
adopted to offset the error into which the decisions have fallen.
This result in some cases has been prevented by permitting the
pledgor to recover as the value of the property its'highest value
between the time of its transfer by the pledgee and the trial of
the action. 32 This measure of damages has been especially
adopted in cases where the pledge has been one of stocks and
bonds, the value of which fluctuates from day to day in the market. Obviously where this rule prevails and whenever it is applied no harm is done the pledgor and he is not deprived of his
election, but the rule does not set the theory of the cases aright,
nor return trover to the performance of its proper role in the law
of conversion.
According to some decisions, if a party to a contract breaks
the same and his breach is one that goes to the essence, his promisee, in addition to being able to sue on the contract and recover
damages, may rescind, and upon making restitution, or offering
to make it, may claim a right to the return of that which he has
already given to his defaulting promisor by way of performance
of his side of the agreement.32 a Perhaps there is room for the
application of this doctrine to a case where the pledgee has illegally appropriated or disposed of the pledge. There can be no
question but that this act on the part of the pledgee is a breach of
the contract and goes to the essence of the agreement. Why not
32. Douglass v. Kraft (1858) 9 Cal. 562; Markham v. Jawdon (1869)
41 N. Y. 235. Other courts allow a plaintiff the highest intermediate value
of the converted property between the time of its conversion and a reasonable time after notice of this act has been received by the plaintiff.
Dimock v. Bank (1893) 55 N. J. L. 296, 25 AtI. 926; Galigher v. Jones
(1888) 129 U. S. 193, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 335. 'As stated 'in the text, "the
highest intermediate value" rule for measuring damages has been confined for the most part to cases of conversion of commercial securities
such as stocks and bonds. Some cases have refused to even apply the
rule in that class of cases; see Jamison & Co.'s Estate (1894) 163 Pa.
143, 29 Atl. 1001; Dalrymple v. Baltimore etc. Co. (1866) 25 Md. 269.
See Walker v. Baland (1855) 21 Mo. 289.
32a. Williston, Contracts, sec. 1455 et seq.
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then permit the pledgor to return the amount of the debt with
interest thereon and demand a return of the pledge and, in case
of the pledgee's refusal, permit an action of trover to lie? If
such an action were permitted it would follow that a pleagor
could sue at any time after the transfer of the pledge by the
pledgee upon making a tender of the debt with proper amount of
interest. The writer knows no case which has proceeded on
2
this theory but it would seem unobjectionable. b
By the better considered authorities, in all cases of conversion, a plaintiff may waive his tort, as it is said, and sue in assumpsit for unjust enrichment. The action will be for goods
sold and delivered or, if the conversion has been a sale, for money
had and received.32c A pledgor, therefore, in the event of the
pledgee's having appropriated the property to his own use may
sue in assumpsit instead, of conversion. In a case of this kind
there are two remedies afforded for the same wrong, either of
32b. The right to rescind is not universally acknowledged. Thus a
seller is held not to have the right to rescind his contract if the buyer
merely fails to perform. Williston, Sales, sec. 511. There is, however,
authority recognizing the right of rescission in the case of a contract for
the conveyance of land. In Ankeney v. Clark (1892) 148 U. S. 345, 13
Sup. Ct. Rep. 617 plaintiff was allowed to recover the value of wheat delivered to defendant in return for the latter's agreement to convey real
estate, which had been broken by defendant. But there is authority
contra. Williston, Contracts, sec. 1460, and cases cited.
It has been held that a plaintiff may replevy a chattel from a defendant who has gotten title to the same from plaintiff through false
representations. The action is used for the purpose of bringing about
a rescission. Porter v. Leyhe (1896) 67 Mo. App. 540. See Williston,
Sales, see. 567. Trover would lie as well as replevin, id.
Conceding, then, a right in the pledgor to rescind upon a tender of
restitution, he ought to be able to bring about this result through an action sounding in conversion. It is a legal short cut to rescission.
32c. If the action is for money had and received, the action in effect
amounts to a ratification of the pledgee's wrongful sale of the goods.
Belden v. Perkins (1875) 78 Ill. 449; Dimock v. U. S. Bank (1893) 55 N.
J. L. 296, 25 Atd. 926; (dictum) Stearns v. Marsh (1874) 4 Denio (N. Y.)
227 (dictum) 47 Am. Dec. 248; Bryson v. Rayner (1866) 25 Md. 424
(dictum) 90 Am. Dec. 69.
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which may be availed of, i. e. the pledgor has an election. The
action of assumpsit for goods sold and delivered is based on the
conversion of the property and the facts which must be shown
by the pledgor to entitle him to sue in conversion must also be
shown to entitle him to sue in assumpsit. The measure of damages will be the same in both actions. If, therefore, a pledgor
sues for goods sold and delivered, his right to do so ought to depend on the theory prevailing in the particular jurisdiction as
to when the right to sue in conversion arises. If it is held that
there is a right to sue in conversion without tender, then there
ought to be a right to sue for goods sold and delivered without
tender; but if a tender is essential to the action in conversion,
33
it should also be essential in assumpsit.
When the pledgee's appropriation of the property involves
its illegal transfer to a third party, the pledgor may, under proper
restrictions, pursue his remedy against the transferee rather than
against the pledgee. If the transferee takes the pledge innocently
not knowing of the pledgor's outstanding interest, and the pledgor
seeks to hold him liable, he should be regarded as the assignee
of the pledgee and as such be given appropriate rights. The
very fact that the pledgee purported to transfer greater rights
than he had, ought to, and will assure to his transferee all the
rights that he did have and was able to legally pass along. While
it is true that the pledgee cannot as a rule separate the lien from
the debt, and if he does the lien is gone and the intended transferee of the lien, gets nothing, this rule ought to prevail only in
cases where the taker of the property is cognizant of the real
situation and does not intend to acquire the interest of the pledgee. It is entirely correct to hold that a purchaser of a lien as
such without the debt gets nothing by his purchase. On the other
hand, however, if A buys property from B, a pledgee, believing
that B owns the same, intending to get full ownership himself
and not to get a lien without a debt, there would seem to be no
real objection to holding that his purchase operated to give him
33. See Woodward, Law Quasi Contract, secs. 270-272, 277.
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all the rights that A had, and hence as an assignment of the debt
and the property as incidental thereto.3 3a In any event, this is the
theory that the courts have adopted when the pledgor proceeds
against an innocent transferee of the pledged propertyand it seems
to work out as justly as possible the rights of the parties. Hence,
if the debt is still unpaid, the pledgor will not be permitted to
hold the transferee for a conversion without a tender of the
amount of the debt 'being made first A4 Naturally if the debt has
already been paid, there is no further obligation resting on the
pledgor so far as a tender is concerned; but the transferee ought
not to be liable for conversion, if he still has the pledge in his
possession and has exercised no acts of ownership over the same,
until the pledgor has given him notice of his rights.3 5
Whenever the transferee knows of the pledge at the time
of acquiring the chattel from the pledgee and does not take the
property innocently, it is held that he becomes by the very act of
taking a converter and the pledgor may sue him without tender
of the debt or a demand for the return of the pledge. 36 Certainly
33a. Talty v. Trust Co. (1876) 93 U. S. 321, 23 L. Ed. 886; Donald v.
Suckling (1866) L. R. 1 Q. B. 586; Williams v. Ashe (1896) 111 Cal. 180,
43 Pac. 595; Bradley v. Parks (1876) 83 Ill. 169; Bank v. Renshaw (1894)
78 Md. 475, 28 At. 281. In Young v. Guy (1882) 87 N. Y. 457 a vendor
of land mortgaged the same to A. to secure an antecedent debt. It
was held that A was not a bona fide purchaser but that he did succeed
to the rights of the vendor, and had a lien on the land to the extent of
the agreed purchase price. The case involves the same principle as applied in the pledge cases, namely, that when a grantee cannot take the
title, which the grantor purports to pass, still he will take whatever interest the grantor did have in the property even though such interest is
merely a debt and security.
34. See supra note 33a.
35. This is the general rule in the case of an innocent conversion.
Pease v. Smith (1875) 61 N. Y. 477. But if the pledgee's transferee has
exercised dominion over the goods and treated them as his own through
use, no demand should be essential. Robinson v. Hartridge (1869) 13
Fla. 501. And see Hyde v. Noble (1843) 13 N. H. 494, 38 Am. Dec. 508
holding mere purchase to constitute a conversion.
36. This proposition is usually assumed, but see supra note 33a, especially Bank v. Renshaw, there cited.
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if the debt has been paid such a decision is correct. The position
of the transferee under such conditions is that of a deliberate converter. If the debt was not paid at the time of the transfer, the
soundness of the rule is not so certain. It is arguable under
these facts that the transfer still operated to assign the pledgee's
interest, which would involve, in some jurisdictions at least, the
further proposition that the pledgor could not hold the transferee
for a conversion without a tender of the debt. 7 Perhaps the
suggestion is sound. It is conceivable that the act, which results
in an assignment where the taking was innocent, should have the
same result where the taking was in bad faith. Of course, the
proposition that the innocent taker is an assignee is adopted to
protect an innocent taker and the right of the transferee is in
the nature of an "equity." Perhaps a court ought not to fabricate an "equity" in favor of a guilty converter. But it is certain
that if it is only a matter of finding an intent the same intent can
be found in the one case as in the other, and so, perhaps, the
transferee ooght to be regarded as standing in the shoes of the
pledgee.
Apparently, the courts only regard the pledgee's innocent
transferee as the assignee of the pledge and of the debt in cases
where the pledgor is suing the latter for the appropriation of the
pledged property. This becomes obvious in the cases where the
pledgor is suing the pledgee for a conversion resulting from the
transfer of the pledge. In most of those cases, as already noted,
the pledgee is permitted to set off or recoup the amount of the
debt secured, thereby reducing the amount of the pledgor's recovery to this extentY8 Permitting this recoupment must be
because the courts regard the pledgee as still being the owner of
the debt. Of course, after the judgment is satisfied the pledgor
no longer has a claim on the converted chattel, and the title, which
the pledgee originally purported to transfer to the purchaser or
taker from him, is a reality so far as the pledgor is concerned 9
37. See supra note 31.
38. See supra note 24a.
39. The judgment's satisfaction operates to pass the pledgor's title to
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There is, therefore, no injustice done to the pledgee's transferee.
He has gotten as complete a title as he could have expected from
the pledgee and his dealings with the latter are left undisturbed.
For this reason it is not necessary in this case, in order to protect the innocent transferee, to hold that he is the assignee of
the debt. If, however, the pledgor sues the transferee, the courts,
in order to protect an innocent party, are forced to regard the
latter as entitled to the debt and to permit its being set off against
the value of the property. If this were not done the transferee
would lose all to no one's legitimate advantage which, as he has
intentionally done no wrong, would be an undesirable result to
reach.
Occasionally the pledgee has illegally transferred the pledge
to another and after so doing has sued the pledgor to recover
the debt.

The action should not lie.A9 a Relief should be denied,

not because the debt has been necessarily paid; it may or may
not have been, depending on the value of the property at the time
of its illegal appropriation by the pledgee. The reason for refusing to give the desired relief should be because the pledgee,
having parted with the pledge, is unable to return it to the pledgor, which, by the agreement between the parties, is a condition
to the pledgor's obligation to pay. It is not proper to allow a
pledgee to insist upon the pledgor's performance of the agreement while lie himself is substantially in default with respect to
the performance of a condition to the pledgor's duty to pay.
There is also a further objection to the pledgee's recovery, namely, that if the pledgee has passed the property to another, such
transferee might be regarded as the owner of the debt, and has
been so regarded where he took the property without notice of
the pledgee or his successor in interest. White v. Martin (1834) 1 Port.
(Ala.) 215, 26 Am. Dec. 365; Miller v. Hyde (1894) 161 Mass. 472, 37
N. E. 760; Stirling v. Garritee (1862) 18 Md. 468; Johnson v. Dun (1899)
75 Minn. 533, 78 N. W. 98.
39a. Sproul v. Sloan (1913) 241 Pa. 284, 88 Atd. 501.
v. Ashby (1895) 132 Mo. 238, p. 247, 33 S. W. 806.

See Richardson
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the pledge.4 0 In spite of the apparent soundness of the above
contention, some cases have allowed the pledgee to sue for the
debt after an illegal disposition of the pledge to a third party
but have reduced the amount of recovery by the value of the
property at the time of its transfer by the pledgee, or within a
reasonable time after notice of its transfer has been brought home
to the pledgor.41 The ratio decidendi of these cases must be that
the debt is something distinct and apart from the security, and
so long as the debt has not been paid it ought to be recoverable,
regardless of what may have happened to the security. It must
be said that so long as the pledgor is privileged to set off or recoup the value of the property no harm or injustice is done.
It is true that in the end each party receives his due in dollars
and cents, but it is believed that the moral effect of such a decision is unwholesome. It makes it possible for a person in the
position of a fiduciary to violate the confidence and trust placed
in him, and to then proceed as if no wrong had been done by him.
The rule just mentioned, permitting the pledgee, in spite
of his conversion, to sue upon the debt has led to the following
situation; the pledgee being a converter may sue the pledgor for
the debt and the pledgor being a defaulting debtor may also sue
40. See supra note 34, and Whitney v. Peay (1862) 24 Ark. 22, accord.
41. In Richardson v. Ashby (1895) 132 Mo. 238, 33 S. W. 806, a pledgee recovered on the debt under the conditions mentioned, but the pledgor
did not resist the action. Minor v. Beveridge (1894) 141 N. Y. 399, 36
N. E. 404; Dimock v. Bank (1893) 55 N. J. L. 296, 25 At. 926; Rush
v Bank (1895) 71 Fed. 102.
Professor Edward H. Warren approves such a decision, urging that
there is "no occasion for the court to lay down a rule that an unauthorized transfer of the pledge forfeits the right in personam to, which the
pledge was security." Warren's Cases on Property, p. 374. It is submitted that the matter is not one of forfeiture but is merely a matter of
contract law. The pledge.cannot be treated as a transaction separate and
apart from the loan; it is a part of the same contract. The agreement
is that when the money is paid the security will be returned. If the
pledgee cannot perform this agreement, his right in personam is not enforceable.
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the pledgee for the conversion.4 2 In the first case the pledgor,
in most jurisdictions, sets off or recoups the value of the property, 43 and in the second case the pledgee reduces the amount of

recovery by the amount of the debt. 44 Although no authority
has been found, it is certain that an action brought by either
party, and pursued to judgment must prevent a suit by the
other party if the appropriate matter for recoupment has been
In the pledgee's action the reduly pleaded and allowed.
coupment is a substitute for the pledgor's action of trover, and
in the pledgor's action it is a substitute for the pledgee's action of debt. The result therefore obviously is that whichever action is brought, the rights of both parties may be finally
settled and adjudicated.. Moreover, if the pledgee's disposition
of the property has been a transfer of the same to another, title
in such transferee may be confirmed because the pledgor in either
45
action is allowed the value of the property.
JAMES LEWIS PARKS

University of Missouri School of Law.

42. See supra notes 28 and 31.
43. See supra note 24a.
44. See supra note 41.
45. Of course, in the normal action of trover the title will not be confirmed in the defendant until the judgment is satisfied. But if the pledgee
is suing the pledgor on the debt, and the debt exceeds the value of the
property, and recoupment is allowed, title will be immediately confirmed because the pledgor is allowed by the recoupment the value of the
property, it being deducted from the pledgee's claim.

